We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the organization of decision-making within firms. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap.
Introduction
Grossman and Hart (1986) developed the incomplete contracts approach to analyze the costs and benefits of vertical integration, which could explain why firms have boundaries, and why not all transactions are taking place within a single firm. The basic idea is that contracts cannot specify all states of nature or all actions in advance, or there are states of nature or actions which cannot be verified ex post by third parties, and which therefore are not ex ante contractible. They used this approach to develop theories of ownership and vertical integration. When contracts cannot specify all possible uses of an asset, the contract must ex ante leave some discretion over the use of the assets: in other words it must allocate ownership of the asset to one or the other party.
The benefit of integration is that the owner avoids hold-up by the other party, which in turn will enhance her incentives to invest in the relationship. The cost is that the other party will tend to under-invest in the relationship.
In this paper we show how the incomplete contract approach can be used to think about the internal organization of firms. The first half has a theoretical focus; we look at how formal and real authority are allocated between the firm's owner and its employees, between the top managers and sub-ordinates, and between firms and financiers. We also examine how the allocation of authority affects communication within the firm.
In the second half of the paper we analyze some of the empirical literature, examining first the determinants of organization (focusing on delegation/decentralization) from the perspective of the Grossman-Hart approach and its extensions, and second the effects of decentralization on firm performance.
The emphasis is on looking at "stylized facts" from large-scale econometric studies of firms rather than at case studies. Case studies are helpful in suggesting theoretical approaches and mechanisms, but are poor for hypotheses testing as they are small in number and highly selective. As with the theory, we also look at decentralization within firms, rather than the more commonly studied issue of boundaries of the firm or vertical integration, which was the original motivation for Grossman and Hart (1986) . 1 We find some support for aspects of the incomplete contracts approach in the importance of the congruence of preferences and firm heterogeneity for decentralization. However, we acknowledge that there are many other stylized facts from the empirical decentralization literature that may require alternative theoretical perspectives.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 examines theory. We look at delegation and authority (2.1), financial contracting (2.2), and delegation and the informational content of decision making (2.4). 2 Section 3 examines the empirical determinants of firm decentralization, focusing on some predictions of the theory (such as the importance of preference congruence as proxied by trust). Section 4 analyzes the effect of decentralization on firm performance.
In Section 5 we conclude and suggest areas for future research.
Theory
2.1 A model of delegation and authority in organizations 2.1.1 Basic model Real authority, i.e. the ability to make decisions, requires information. But acquiring information in turn requires time and effort. Thus, for example, the CEO of a big holding company that consists of several horizontally integrated units, can only devote limited attention to each unit, which in turn implies that more real authority will lie with downstream agents in each unit. In fact, increasing the "span of control" is one way in which a top manager can commit to leave more real authority, and therefore more initiative, to her subordinates in various branches of activity. More generally, it is the design of the organization, together with the allocation of formal decision rights, that will determine how real authority is distributed within the firm.
The issue of real versus formal authority and of the implications of this distinction for the optimal design of firm organization is addressed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) using an incomplete contracts/property rights approach.
Their basic framework involves two parties: P(principal) and A(agent). It is assumed that formal authority can be allocated contractually (e.g. shareholders allocate authority to the board of directors). In turn, boards allocate authority to management -and management to different layers of management, and so on.
By contrast, real authority is exerted by the party which has information; this may be the party with formal authority, but not neccessarily so. Contractual incompleteness is again key to the whole analysis: contracts signed ex ante between P and A cannot specify particular project choices, as these are not verifiable by third parties.
After the contract is signed, both P and A can invest in information acquisition: by investing effort 1 2 E 2 ; P acquires information with probability E:
Similarly, by investing effort 1 2 e 2 ; A acquires information with probability e:
An important parameter in the analysis of the costs and benefits of delegating formal (or real) authority to A is the degree of congruence between P's and A's preferences. Let denote the probability that P's preferred project is also A's preferred project (call this congruence between the two parties' preferences), and suppose that a party gets zero utility if the other party chooses her preferred project and preferences are not congruent. Finally, assume that an uninformed party will never pick a project at random as this might be too risky.
The timing of moves is as follows. First, the two parties sign a contract that allocates formal authority to one party, either P or A. Then, both parties invest in information acquisition, i.e. P and A choose E and e respectively. Then, if she acquires information, the party with no formal authority proposes a project to the party with formal authority. The party with formal authority then either picks her preferred project (if she herself has acquired information) or she picks the project proposed to her by the party without formal authority if she did not acquire information. It is in this latter case that real authority differs from formal authority, since the project is actually chosen by the party without formal authority (the party with formal authority is uninformed and therefore can only rubberstamp the other party's project proposal).
P delegating formal authority to her agent A involves a cost and a benefit.
The cost is that the agent may choose a project which the principal does not prefer. This is the loss of control effect. The benefit is that delegating formal authority to the agent encourages her to invest more effort (i.e. higher e) in information acquisition. This is the initiative effect. Which effect dominates depends upon the congruence parameter : there exists a cut-off value such that for < , the first effect dominates, and it is better for P to retain formal authority, whereas for > , the second effect dominates and it is better for P to delegate formal authority to A.
Since preference congruence turns out to be so critical for decentralization decisions, we examine this in the empirical section where there does appear to be some compelling evidence for the importance of empirical proxies for congruence, such as trust. Below we show that this is a robust prediction of generalizations to the basic theoretical approach. Aghion and Tirole (1997) , AT, several papers have analyzed the allocation of formal authority internally in organizations. We shall describe some of these attempts in the next subsections. At this stage, let us mention a first attempt by Hart and Moore (1999) , HM. HM analyze the optimal allocation of authority in multi-layer hierarchies. Their model is one where by assumption, upstream agents are less likely to get new ideas (getting an idea in HM is like obtaining information in AT) due to their higher span of control. However, when they do get an idea, this idea has higher potential because of their greater span. HM then show that it is optimal to have "chains of commands", whereby whenever they have an idea, upstream agents (the "generalists") have priority rights over implementing the idea; only if they don't gave an idea can downstream agents (the "specialists") have their say on which action to implement. The intuition is that although upstream agents are less likely to get a new idea, having priority control rights makes sure that they are in control of all the assets downstream, which in turn allows them to fully realize the idea's potential. But if they fail to get a new idea, then the next downstream agent on each branch of the hierarchy should have her say if she has an idea, and so on, moving down in the hierarchy.
Extensions Subsequent to
So far, we have concentrated on the allocation of formal authority within organizations. However, going back to AT, it could be that delegating formal authority to A is too costly to P, for example because with arbitrarily small probability, A might take some very costly action. In that case P will always want to retain formal authority, but yet she may want to commit herself not to invest too much in information acquisition, so as to preserve the A's incentives to invest in e even though she keeps formal authority with herself. One way to achieve such commitment is through the choice of span of control.
More specifically, by increasing the span of control, i.e. the number of agents and activities under her supervision, the principal will commit to limiting how much effort she devotes to acquiring information on each particular activity.
This in turn will encourage initiative by agents on each activity, as they anticipate that the principal will ignore their proposals less often (as she will not have acquired the relevant information). The choice of the optimal span of control by the principal at date zero is in turn subject to the same trade-off between the principal's loss of control and the agents' initiatives as above. This trade-off also underlies other features of organizational design, such as the role of intermediaries, the costs and benefits of having multiple principals on some activities, or the optimal combination of tasks within teams. As a general point, although decentralization models in the GH-AT tradition generate a rich set of predictions, it is fair to say that relatively few of these have been subject to rigorous empirical examination. One main reason for this is that it is hard to develop empirical analogs of theoretical objects such as decentralization, information and communication in one firm, let alone in large-scale databases suitable for econometric analysis. In Section 3 we focus on some areas where empirical progress has been made.
Financial contracting and the role of contingent control allocations
Since the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) -which suggested that the mix of debt and equity a firm has does not affect its value-economists have wondered why most firms have some combination of debt and equity financing.
Debt has certain tax advantages (interest is typically tax deductible for the firm but dividend payments are not), yet corporate debt was prevalent even before corporate income tax existed. Why would firms have debt, then?
Aghion and Bolton (1992) Suppose that an entrepreneur needs to finance a project that costs K = 10:
She does not have private wealth and thus needs funding from an outside investor. The investor cares only for monetary benefits, whereas the entrepreneur only draws private benefits from taking various actions. Actions are not verifiable by a third party and therefore cannot be contracted upon ex ante. Hence, all the initial contract can do is allocate control rights between the two parties.
The timing of the relationship between the entrepreneur and the investor can be described as follows. At the contracting stage, the two parties write a financial contract which allocates control rights. The contract must be "feasible,"
i.e. it must satisfy the investor's ex ante participation constraint (she must get at least as much as her outside option in expectation denote the private benefit from taking action a in any state and suppose that
(a 2 ; g ) = 10; (a 2 ; b ) = 6 and B(a 1 ) = 2 < B(a 2 ) = 4
The first best involves a 1 being chosen in state b and a 2 being chosen in
We can now compare three governance structures, which correspond to three types of financial contracts. Entrepreneur control (e.g. as implemented through issuing non-voting shares), would lead to action a 2 being chosen in all states, but this would violate the investor's participation constraint since 1 2 (6) + 1 2 (10) = 8 < 10 = K:
The investor has cash which he might use to convince the entrepreneur to take action a 1 in state b : However, if most of the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage lies with the entrepreneur, the prospect of ex post renegotiation will not help satisfy the investor's ex ante participation constraint. In this case, entrepreneur control is not ex ante feasible. How about investor control (e.g. as implemented through issuing voting equity)? In this case the investor will choose action a 1 in all states, even though action a 2 is the first best action in state b ; i.e. the action that maximizes the sum of monetary and private benefits in that state. Now, can the entrepreneur renegotiate the action from a 1 to a 2 in state g ? The answer is no, simply because the entrepreneur has no cash she can use to bribe the investor into changing his choice of action. Investor control satisfies the investor's participation constraint, since
However it is not first-best, as total surplus would be maximized by having action a 1 taken in state b and action a 2 taken in state g :
Now, consider a contract that specifies a contingent allocation of controlto the entrepreneur in state g and to the investor in state b : This contract will lead to action a 1 being taken in state b and action a 2 being taken in state g :
Contingent control can in turn be implemented through a debt contract that transfers control from the entrepreneur to the investor in state b :
The idea that contingent control can help align incentives goes beyond financial contracting. For example Bolton and Dewatripont (2011) Garicano (2000)).
Delegation as a way to improve the informational content of decision-making
Dessein (2002) analyzes how the allocation of control can help incorporate the agent's information into decision-making in a situation where the agent has private information. In contrast to Aghion and Tirole (1997) , there is no information acquisition effort by the agent or the principal, therefore in Dessein's model the allocation of authority is not so much a tool to motivate the agent (as in Aghion and Tirole) or to give a supplier incentives to make relationship specific investments (as in Grossman and Hart). The main insight of Dessein (2002) is that in a world with asymmetric information and contractual incompleteness, the delegation of authority from a principal to an agent is often the best way to elicit the agent's private information.
In Dessein's setting the agent is assumed to be better informed, but with preferences over decisions that are not fully congruent with those of the principal. If the principal has authority (i.e. if she holds the decision rights), which
Dessein refers to as "centralization", then the agent communicates his information "strategically" in order to tilt the principal's decision. Centralization thus results in information loss. However, while "delegating" control to the agent avoids this information loss, it also makes the agent's biased decision-making prevail. Delegation thus results in a loss of control. Dessein (2002) shows that for a broad range of parameters, the loss of control under delegation matters less than the loss of information under centralization. In particular, the smaller the agent's bias (i.e. the more congruent the principal's and agent's objectives are), or the larger the agent's informational advantage, or the more uncertainty there is, the more likely it is that delegation is optimal.
An important assumption in Dessein (2002) is that under "principal authority", the principal cannot commit to not taking the decision which she believes maximizes her expected utility. She can, however, commit to "delegate" control rights to the agent. This is consistent with the incomplete contracting assumption that actions or decisions are non-contractible, even when control allocation is contractible. Delegation can then be interpreted as a commitment device from the principal to use the agent's information in the way that best fits the agent's objectives. While delegation results in biased decision-making 
Measuring firm decentralization
A key factor in any organization is who makes decisions. A centralized firm is one were decisions are all taken at the top of the hierarchy, and a decentralized firm is where decision-making is more evenly dispersed throughout the corporate hierarchy. and over the allocation of tasks.
Trust (congruence of preferences)
The Aghion-Tirole approach offers a natural implementation of incomplete contracts to study decentralization within firms. One key parameter in fostering decentralization is the congruence of preferences between principal and agent.
Other theoretical developments following Grossman-Hart such as Baker et al. Enforcement of contracts should further foster decentralization, and we do in fact observe more delegation where there is stronger rule of law 5 . However, contracts are never perfectly enforceable, which leaves a role for trust to help generate more delegation. Recently, Bloom et al. (2012) ran field experiments on firms in India, and discovered that family size (in particular the number of adult male family members) was the key determinant of firm size, probably due to the importance of trust. Owners only trusted other family members to make major managerial decisions as they worried that outsiders would steal from the firm. Hence, the supply of (trusted) male family member time was typically the binding factor for firm growth.
Learning
In the theory section we discussed an extension to the Aghion-Tirole approach when considering how firms could learn either from other firms or from them-
selves. Acemoglu et al. (2007) examine three predictions from their model (i)
delegation should be greater when the industry is more heterogeneous (so it is harder to learn from others); (ii) the firm is close to the frontier (so that there are fewer other firms to learn from) and (iii) the firm is younger (so it has less experience to learn from its own mistakes). Acemoglu et al. (2007) measure decentralization using both formal measures of whether firms are organized into profit centers as discussed above (for French firms) and direct survey measures of the power managers have over hiring decisions (for British firms). In both samples they find decentralization is more likely in industries that are more heterogeneous and for firms that are younger or closer to the technological frontier. there is less need of delegation to a local manager who is better informed but may not pursue the principal's interests.
Other empirical factors influencing decentralization
The development of the incomplete contracts approach as applied to firm decentralization appears to have some confirmation in the data. The congruence of preferences (as proxied by trust) and heterogeneity (making it harder to learn) both seem to foster decentralization. There are many other findings in the literature on the empirical determinants of decentralization. These are not so obviously implications of the Grossman-Hart approach, but it is worth con-sidering them.
3.4.1 Firm size and scope Some basic factors determine decentralization.
All else equal, a larger firm will require more decentralization than a small firm. A sole entrepreneur does not need to delegate because she is her own boss, but as more workers are added, doing everything herself is no longer feasible. Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1962) stressed that decentralization was a necessary feature of larger firms, because CEOs do not have the time to take every decision in large firms (see also Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1991) .
Similarly as firms expand in their scope both geographically and in product space, local information will become more costly to transmit so this will also favor decentralization.
Most empirical findings support this. Bloom et al. (2012b) find that firm size and plant size are both associated with a significant increase in their decentralization index. Furthermore, plant managers in subsidiaries of foreign multinationals have more autonomy than similar plants of domestic nonmultinationals. They interpret this as an indicator that managing at a distance is harder, inducing headquarters to give more autonomy to local managers. French firms they find that regions where skill premia are higher have a lower probability of decentralization.
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
Garicano (2000) formalizes the idea of the firm as a cognitive hierarchy. There are a number of problems to be solved and the task is how to solve them in the most efficient manner. The simplest tasks are performed by those at the lowest level of the hierarchy, and the "exceptional" problems are passed upwards to an expert.
The cost of passing problems upwards is that communication is expensive.
The benefit of passing the problem upwards is that it reduces the cognitive burden on lower level employees. Computer networks (reducing communication costs) significantly decrease decentralization to plant managers, whereas tools to help managers access more information (like ERP) significantly increase decentralization. 
Organizational practices and firm productivity
How can researchers identify the effects of organizational structure (e.g. decentralization) on firm performance? Consider the basic production function as
Where q is ln(output), l is ln(labor) and k is ln(capital) of firm i at time t.
Assume that we can write the TFP term a it as
where m it is an organizational feature of the firm (such as decentralization) and u it is an unobserved error. Together these equations imply
This of course contains several assumptions. It assumes that the relevant organizational factor enters linearly, whereas organization could instead be affecting the coefficients on the other factor inputs, and many theories (e.g. of complementarity) would generate the same predictions. We discuss these below.
We will assume that we can deal with the econometric problems in estimating the coefficients on the production function so that we have a consistent measure of total factor productivity (see Ackerberg et al. (2006) , for a discussion of recent contributions). Note that OLS estimates of (1) will generally be biased, as E(m it u it 6 = 0).
The traditional strategy is to assume that m it is a firm fixed effect. So one approach is simply to recover average firm TFP under this assumption and project it on some cross-sectional measure of management m i . This will indicate whether there is an association between the two measures, but not whether the relationship is causal. For example, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show that there is a robust relationship between TFP and their measure of management quality, but they interpret this as an "external validity" test of the quality of the management data rather than as any causal relationship.
An analogous strategy if there are time varying measures of organization is to treat all the correlated unobservables as fixed, i.e. u it = i + " it with
Then the fixed effect model estimated in (say) first differences would be
which can be consistently estimated by OLS.
There are a huge number of studies that have correlated various aspects of the firm's performance on various aspects of its organizational form (e.g. the survey in Lazear and Oyer, 2012) . The better studies use micro data and pay careful attention to measurement issues and need to control for many covariates. For example, Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Black and Lynch (2001) examine various aspects of "high performance" workplaces, mostly relating to employee involvement, team work and meetings. Both papers look across many industries and find no direct effect of these measures on performance (in contrast to many case studies). As we discuss below, Ichniowski et al.
(1997), however, examined management practices and performance in 37 US steel mills over time and found a link between upgrading to bundles of modern practices and improved performance, so the correlation evidence is mixed.
There remain several serious problems. First is the data constraint that measuring organization is hard and finding data with time series variation even harder. Second, the management proxies are measured with error, so this will cause attenuation towards zero if the measurement error is classical. This bias is exacerbated in first differences. Third, and most seriously, the factors that cause variation in the propensity to adopt organizational practices will also likely be correlated with those affecting TFP so the assumption is unlikely to hold in most cases. The bias could be upwards or downwards (e.g. if firms do- rose by 21% mainly with at least half due to improved selection (the managers allocated more fields to the ablest workers rather than to their colleagues).
Complementarities between organizational practices
One of the key reasons why firms may find it difficult to adjust their organizational form is that there are important complementarities between sets of organizational practices. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) build a theoretical structure where such complementarities (or more precisely, super-additivities) mean that firms optimally choose clusters of practices that "fit together". When the environment change so that an entrant firm would use this group of optimal practices, incumbent firms will find it harder -they will either switch a large number of practices together, or none at all.
This has important implications for productivity analysis. The effects of introducing a single practice will be heterogeneous between firms and depend on what practices they already use. This implies that linear regressions of the form of equation (3) may be misleading. To see this, consider two practices, m 1 and m 2 , whose relationship with productivity is such that TFP increases only when both are used together.
One version of the complementary hypothesis is 1 > 0; 2 < 0; and 12 > 0, i.e. the disruption caused by just using one practice (m factor demand analysis we would examine the cross price effects to gauge the existence of complements versus substitutes, i.e. does demand for practice 1 fall when the price of practice 2 rises (all else equal). There still remains the concern that the price shocks could be correlated with the productivity shocks, but such an assumption is weaker than assuming unobserved shocks to the firm's choice of practices are uncorrelated. Unfortunately, such tests are particularly hard to implement because there are generally no market prices for the organizational factors typically considered.
An alternative strategy is to work straight from the production function (or performance equation more generally). Consider the productivity equation af-ter substituting in multiple practices:
Ichniowski et al. (1997) estimate a version of equation (6) using very disaggregate panel data on finishing lines in US steel mills, using eleven human resource practices (including incentive pay, recruitment, teamwork, job flexibility and rotation). Their measure of productivity is based on downtime -the less productive lines were idle for longer. They find that introducing one or two practices has no effect on productivity, but introducing a large number together significantly raises productivity. Although the endogeneity problem is not eliminated, the controls for fixed effects, looking within one firm and using performance data, helps reduce some of the more obvious sources of bias.
The role of ICT again
One of the key productivity puzzles of recent years has been why the returns to the use of information and communication technologies appear to be so high and so heterogeneous between firms and between countries. For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) find that the elasticity of output with respect to ICT capital is far higher than its share in gross output (see also Stiroh, 2002) .
One explanation for this is that effective use of ICT also requires significant changes in firm organization. Changing the notation of (6) slightly, we could write
with the hypothesis that cm > 0. This is broadly the position of papers in the macro literature explaining the faster productivity growth of the US than Lemieux et al. (2009) show that one particular people management practice, performance pay, is becoming increasingly important in the US and has a significant impact on widening inequality.
They suggest that the spread of ICT innovations has facilitated the adoption of performance pay techniques.
The role of human capital
One of the reasons for the renewed interest in organizational change by labor economists was the attempt to understand why technology seemed to increase the demand for human capital, thus contributing to the rise in wage This has three main implications:
1. Decentralization leads to skill upgrading within firms. This is due to the fact that the return to new work practices is greater when the skill level of the workforce is higher.
2. A lower price of skilled labor will accelerate the introduction of organizational changes.
3. Skill intensive firms will experience greater productivity growth when decentralizing.
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) find support for all three predictions. They estimate production functions (with the relevant interactions), skill share equations and organizational design equations. A novel feature of this approach is that because labor is traded in a market, it is possible to use local skill price variation to examine complementarity issues. They find that higher skill prices make decentralization less likely, consistent with "skill-biased organizational change".
Conclusions
We began by surveying the theoretical literature on the organization of firms and the optimal decentralization of decision rights within firms. We discussed how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes this organization of decision making within firms. In particular, the inability to contract over all possible states of the world leads principals to delegate control to agents as a way to ex ante commit to letting agents expropriate some of the returns from costly activities, like collecting information on the best actions to take.
We then overviewed some of the empirical evidence on the organization and management of firms, focusing on decentralization. We looked at within firm organization, especially decentralization following the theoretical survey, and we also looked at econometric studies, focusing on large scale firm databases rather than case studies. There has recently been a number of papers measuring management and organizational practices across firms and countries. Like productivity, decentralization varies a lot across firms and countries (e.g. Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon firms are more decentralized than those from Asia and Southern Europe). A number of factors highlighted in the incomplete con-NOTES 37
tract theory are shown to be important for accounting for differences in firm organization -in particular heterogeneity and the congruence of preferences (as proxied by trust). Several other factors appear robustly positively correlated with decentralization, such as product market competition, human capital and firm size.
In terms of future work, we see two areas of opportunity. First, there is a need to match up empirical work more closely with the theory. Until recently, comprehensive datasets on measures of organization across many firms and countries were unavailable. Now that this gap in the core data infrastructure is being covered, there is a great opportunity for testing some of the theories of organizational economics. This is challenging, first because many of the important aspects in the environment emphasized in the theoretical literature are hard to match into empirical counterparts, and second because identifying the causal relationship between organizational changes and firm outcomes like productivity and growth is difficult. Even with strong measurement and tight links to theory, it is essential to identify the direction of causality in some of stylized empirical results we have identified above -for example, do skilled managers enable more decentralized decision making, or are skilled managers attracted to more decentralized firms? We see the theory and empirics of the organization of the firm as one of the key growth areas in economics over the next twenty-five years. 
